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The economic recovery proceeded throughout last year and 2011 to date, driven by the 
strength of the world economy, the expansionary economic policy stance and the fiscal 
policy stimulus in the first half of the year (see Chart 4.1). Nevertheless, in 2010 the euro 
area faced a severe sovereign debt crisis which affected various member countries and 
posed a serious threat to the stability of the area. The gravity of the situation called for 
substantial reform of the institutional framework underpinning the euro area, directed par-
ticularly at the mechanisms of economic policy coordination and supervision. The role of 
structural policies was also strengthened so as to achieve greater efficiency in the use of 
factors of production and return to a path of sustained economic growth, which is vital in 
those economies that have to reabsorb imbalances accumulated in the past.
The doubts about the sustainability of public finances in various euro area member coun-
tries, which are at the origin of the sovereign debt crisis, stemmed from a combination of 
diverse factors. General government finances deteriorated notably as a result of the acti-
vation of automatic stabilisers during the crisis, the roll-out of discretionary stimulus meas-
ures and, in some countries, the loss of the extraordinary revenue associated with the real 
estate boom and the use of public funds to stabilise the banking sector. Moreover, in some 
cases the starting level of public debt was already high at the outset of the crisis, a situa-
tion which was aggravated by the high contingent liabilities arising from the foreseeable 
impact of progressive population aging on the public pension system and by the uncer-
tainty surrounding the return of the funds invested in bank restructuring processes. How-
ever, leaving aside these purely fiscal developments, the growth outlook for some euro 
area economies was inauspicious due to the accumulation of macroeconomic imbalances 
over the past decade, which has given rise to high levels of private indebtedness, substan-
tial loss of competitiveness and elements of fragility in banking systems.
The crisis also highlighted fundamental fragilities in the instruments of coordination and 
macroeconomic supervision of the euro area, which proved to be insufficient to instil the 
necessary degree of discipline and give due attention to the macro-financial imbalances 
developing in some economies and requiring corrective economic policy action. It also 
became apparent that the euro area authorities did not have formal mechanisms for coor-
dinated crisis management and resolution, which meant that the required financial assis-
tance had to be hastily designed and implemented. Both of these shortcomings take on 
greater importance in a situation in which, as the current crisis has shown, shocks are 
propagated between euro area countries substantially more rapidly and intensely: the 
drastic repricing of one country’s sovereign risk was rapidly transformed into a heightened 
perception of bank vulnerability, a change in the assessment of the economic situation in 
other countries and a widespread crisis of confidence in the euro area.
The credit rating of public debt was downgraded in all of the most strongly affected coun-
tries and sovereign spreads rose suddenly, albeit to differing extents depending on the 
fiscal and economic situation and outlook of the countries involved (see Chart 4.2). Greek 
public debt was downgraded to speculative status and its spread over the German bund 
exceeded 1,200 basis points (bp) despite the financial assistance received in May. The 
rates in Ireland and Portugal climbed to 700 bp and 600 bp, respectively, above the Ger-
man bund. The deterioration in sovereign risk premia in Spain, Italy and Belgium was more 
limited, but significant at times, particularly in Spain.
1  Sovereign debt crisis
in the euro area
The sovereign debt crisis 
prompted a reform of the 
institutional framework
and an overhaul of the 
priorities of economic policy
The crisis stemmed from 
major imbalances in some 
Member States
... but also evidenced 
deficiencies in the design
and functioning of policy 
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prevention and resolution 
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and the euro area
Sovereign spreads widened
to differing extents
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The tension also affected other financial variables, in some cases very unevenly across 
sectors and countries. The euro exchange rate depreciated by more than 10% in nominal 
effective terms from October 2009 to end-2010, against a background of high volatility. 
The EUROSTOXX 50 index fell by 6% in the year and, save the German DAX which rose 
by more than 16%, the main European stock exchanges fell sharply, particularly in the fi-
nancial sector and in the countries hit hardest by the crisis (see Chart 4.3). Moreover, the 
fall in government bond prices exposed the euro area banking sector to losses in their 
available-for-sale asset portfolios, while the perceived greater fragility of the public sector 
weakened the explicit or implicit guarantee that it can provide to the financial system. The 
institutions of the most affected countries faced more limited access to the wholesale 
funding markets and encountered serious liquidity problems, having to resort to Eurosys-
tem funds and, in extreme cases, to emergency liquidity assistance from their respective 
national central banks. By contrast, non-financial corporations and, above all, households 
were comparatively less affected by these tensions, since they scarcely passed through to 
the availability and cost of bank loans, although countries did vary somewhat in this re-
spect. Against a background of notable weakness in demand, lending followed a similar 
cyclical pattern to that observed historically.
After serious deficiencies were found in the statistical information on its public accounts 
and various months of hesitation and reluctance, Greece finally requested financial as-
sistance in May. This support amounted to €100 billion, provided under a programme of 
... and tension was 
appreciable in other financial 
markets
The institutional response
of the euro area initially 
calmed the tensions...
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bilateral loans from euro area countries (€80 billion) and from the IMF, subject to strict 
conditionality. Further, to reduce the risk of contagion, a new financial assistance 
scheme was designed which, under similar conditions to those of the Greek programme, 
would be available until mid-2013 to any euro area member needing it. This scheme 
comprises: the new European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), a euro area 
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instrument able to mobilise up to €60 billion; the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF), able to grant loans with a maximum guarantee of €440 billion from euro area Mem-
ber States; and IMF financing equal to up to 50% of the amount drawn from the EFSM 
and the EFSF. The tensions during the summer were eased by establishment of these 
instruments, along with the commencement of work to improve European governance, 
the publication of bank stress tests and the expediting and strengthening of fiscal con-
solidation plans with a firm commitment to introduce structural reforms in some euro 
area Member States.
However, the situation changed when in Ireland the deterioration in the financial position 
of its banks sparked a fresh outbreak of tensions. The excessive size of the Irish banking sec-
tor relative to the economy as a whole, the concentration of real estate risk and its depend-
ence on wholesale financing made this sector extremely vulnerable to the international fi-
nancial crisis (from 2008), to the intense domestic recession and to the adjustment in the 
Irish real estate sector. These circumstances forced activation of the financial support 
mechanisms at the end of November, with an assistance programme valued at €85 billion, 
which included funds to be contributed by the Irish government itself and bilateral loans 
from the United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark.
Later, in April 2011, Portugal also requested financial support from the European institu-
tions and the IMF. The institutional paralysis in this economy following the resignation of 
the government, when a fresh fiscal adjustment plan was rejected in parliament, made it 
the focus of the tensions. Its problems achieving fiscal consolidation objectives had previ-
ously been highlighted, against a background in which the competitive imbalances accu-
mulated in recent years and the high indebtedness of firms and households hampered the 
attainment of a sustained rate of growth. The support programme approved in May 
amounted to €78 billion, to be distributed equally between the EFSF, the EFSM and the 
IMF, and, like the previous programmes, it is subject to strict conditionality, with relatively 
ambitious structural reform measures required.
The recurrent bouts of instability during the first few months of 2011 were also fuelled 
by the lack of determination on the part of the governments to clarify certain details of 
present and future support mechanisms. In this context, in March the European Coun-
cil sanctioned the legislative reforms in progress to strengthen the domestic economic 
policy coordination and mutual supervision mechanisms and adopted significant 
measures to further the design of the future European Stability Mechanism (ESM), 
which will begin to function in July 2013. Also, to strengthen the governments’ resolve 
to establish policies more favourable to growth and more consistent with the financial 
integration environment achieved in the euro area, the heads of state and government 
of the euro area decided to establish the Euro Plus Pact. The new strengthened gov-
ernance framework was thus practically given its final shape. In the medium term, this 
new framework will reduce the probability of a repetition of situations like the present 
one and, in the event they do occur, give the area the necessary tools to manage them 
effectively.
However, in the shorter term, sovereign risk spreads continue to fluctuate sharply, reflect-
ing the complexities of the situation in Ireland, in Portugal and, fundamentally, in Greece. 
The difficulties that have become apparent in complying with the timetable envisaged in 
the programme for Greece are presenting the euro area with a challenge unprecedented in 
its short history; a significant effort will be required to rule out the possibility of unpredict-
able traumatic scenarios for the common European project.
... but the worsening of the 
situation of the banking sector 
and of the Irish public 
finances, and the difficulties
in agreeing on an internal 
economic adjustment 
programme in Portugal
(in 2011) required activation
of the new support 
mechanisms
In March 2011 substantial 
changes to the institutional 
framework of the euro area 
were adopted, but the area 
continued to confront the 
biggest challenge of its history
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During 2010 the recovery in economic activity that commenced in mid-2009 continued, so 
that GDP grew by 1.7%, following a decline of 4.1% in 2009. As seen in Table 4.1, goods 
and services exports grew notably, following the collapse recorded in 2009, thanks to the 
boost from world trade, while the increase was somewhat more contained in the case of 
imports, in line with their smaller decline in the recession. Accordingly, the contribution of 
net external demand was very positive, and the largest to have been recorded since the 
start of Stage Three of EMU. The contribution of the change in inventories was also large 
in historical terms.
2  Macroeconomic 
developments: 
consolidation
of the recovery
In 2010 the recovery in the 
euro area firmed, underpinned 
by foreign trade and the 
change in the inventory cycle 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
DEMAND AND OUTPUT (quarter-on-quarter rates):
    Gross domestic product 0.3 -4.1 1.7 0.4 1.0 0.4 0.3
    Private consumption 0.4 -1.1 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4
    Government consumption 2.3 2.5 0.7 -0.1 0.2 0.4 0.1
    Gross jxed capital formation -1.0 -11.2 -1.0 -0.2 2.1 -0.2 -0.5
        Non-residential private investment 0.3 -14.9 0.7 0.7 2.5 0.4 0.8
        Residential investment -5.3 -10.7 -3.6 -0.6 0.7 -0.3 -0.2
        Public investment 1.6 5.1 -3.4 -3.8 -0.1 -0.4 -1.5
    Exports 0.7 -13.1 10.9 3.0 4.5 2.1 1.5
    Imports 0.6 -11.7 9.0 3.6 4.2 1.5 1.0
    Contributions to GDP growth in percentage points:
    Domestic demand 0.5 -2.5 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.1
    Change in stocks -0.2 -0.9 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.0 -0.1
    External demand 0.0 -0.7 0.8 -0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
PRICES AND COSTS (year-on-year rates):
    Consumer prices (annual average) 3.3 0.3 1.6 1.1 1.6 1.7 2.0
    GDP dekator 2.1 1.0 0.8 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.0
    Unit labour costs 3.7 3.8 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.2
    Compensation per employee 3.2 1.4 1.7 1.6 2.1 1.5 1.6
    Labour productivity -0.4 -2.3 2.2 2.2 2.6 2.1 1.8
GENERAL GOVERNMENT (% of GDP):
    Total expenditure 46.9 50.8 50.8
    Current expenditure 43.1 46.6 46.6
    Public investment 2.6 2.8 2.7
    Total revenue 44.9 44.5 44.4
    Primary dejcit (–) / surplus (+) 1.0 -3.5 -3.5
    Dejcit (–) / surplus (+) -2.0 -6.3 -6.3
    Public debt 69.8 79.2 84.2
LABOUR MARKET:
    Total employment (quarter-on-quarter rates) 0.8 -1.8 -0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2
    Unemployment (% of labour force) 7.7 9.5 10.1 10.0 10.1 10.1 10.0
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (% of GDP)
    Current account -1.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.8 -0.8 -0.3 0.2
DEBT RATIOS:
    Households (% of GDI) 95.6 97.4 98.7 97.3 98.4 98.4 98.7
    Non-jnancial corporations (% of GOS) 494.4 555.5 538.1 554.3 549.4 545.8 538.1
2010
2008 2009 2010
EURO AREA: MAIN MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS TABLE 4.1 
SOURCES: ECB, European Commission and OECD. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 104 ANNUAL REPORT, 2010 4. THE EURO AREA AND THE COMMON MONETARY POLICY
Domestic demand also recovered, although less strongly. Among its components, private 
consumption – notable on account of its relative importance – increased, despite the re-
duction in disposable income, driven by the growth in financial and non-financial wealth 
and by the improvement in expectations regarding the economic situation. Fiscal consoli-
dation in the euro area countries resulted in a notable slowdown in government consump-
tion and a sharp fall in public investment. Finally, there was a pick-up in business invest-
ment, spurred by the expansion in final demand, while residential investment fell for the 
third year running, since the adjustment in the real-estate sector in some euro area coun-
tries has still not been completed.
Euro area employment declined slightly in 2010 as a whole, but tended to stabilise over the 
year as hours worked recovered to their pre-crisis levels (see Charts 4.1 and 4.4, and 
Box 4.1). However, the rate of unemployment increased again, with joblessness concen-
trated among young people and the long-term unemployed, which involves a loss of hu-
man capital.
By country, significant differences in the performance of activity were recorded, with a 
vigorous increase in GDP in Germany and significant falls in Greece and Ireland, as a con-
sequence of the general collapse in the components of their domestic demand, largely 
associated with the low levels of confidence and the application of the highly restrictive 
fiscal policies needed to restore fiscal sustainability and market confidence. Increased 
buoyancy in the German economy was based partly on the export growth, assisted by the 
robust growth in the world economy, but also by the business restructuring and structural 
reforms undertaken over the last decade, which have resulted in competitiveness improve-
ments. In addition, German domestic demand displayed a comparatively strong recovery, 
owing to the buoyancy of equipment investment, which was driven by exports, and of 
government consumption, given the limited need for fiscal adjustment.
Since the beginning of 2010, the developments in the harmonised index of consumer 
prices (HICP) have been determined by the strong rise in its energy and food components, 
linked to the progressive increase in commodity prices. This tendency intensified from the 
end of the year, as a consequence of the rise in the price of oil stemming from the bouts of 
political instability in certain oil producing countries, so that inflation reached 2.8% in April 
2011, up from 1% in January 2010 (see Chart 4.1). The year-on-year rate of change in the 
prices of the most stable components of the HICP (services and non-energy industrial 
While growth in domestic 
demand was weaker
Employment stabilised
The divergence in the 
performance of activity across 
the euro area countries has 
been very marked
Inflation rose, impacted
by the surge in commodity 
prices
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During the recent economic and financial crisis, there has been 
less job destruction in the euro area as a whole, in relation to the 
fall in activity (see table below). However, this aggregate perfor-
mance masks very diversified behaviour. In Austria, Belgium and 
Germany, despite the contraction in activity, the decline in em-
ployment has been very limited or even zero, in contrast – espe-
cially in Germany – with the crisis experienced at the beginning 
of the 1990s. At the opposite end of the spectrum, Spain and 
Ireland stand out not only because employment over-reacted to 
the fall in activity, with the numbers employed declining by more 
than 8%, but also because job destruction has lasted longer 
(see Panel 3).
The diversity of employment’s reaction to the fall in activity seems 
to be in response to the combination of three factors:1 the idiosyn-
cratic nature of the recession in certain countries, aside from the 
global financial shock; the structure of national labour markets; 
and the different economic policy responses implemented by gov-
ernments.
In Spain and Ireland the contraction in activity has been accompa-
nied by a specific shock in the real estate sector. Thus, in Ireland, 
the decline in the construction sector seems to have directly ex-
plained half of the job destruction (see Panel 1), with a reduction of 
this sector’s weight in the labour force of more than 4 pp during 
the crisis. In Spain 40% of the jobs destroyed were in construc-
tion,2 a sector that represented 12% of total employment in the 
economy at the beginning of the crisis.
The labour market legislative framework in each country has also 
played an important role in limiting or amplifying the scale of the 
contraction in employment.3 In line with economic literature, job 
destruction has been more contained in countries with greater sta-
bility in contracts (linked to higher firing costs) and with more flex-
ible collective bargaining systems. This positive effect of the insti-
tutional framework on incentives to maintain employment has 
been particularly important in those countries with higher demand 
for skilled labour in which, therefore, the potential costs to firms of 
laying off employees are higher. This has been the case of Ger-
many and Austria, where, although the proportion of skilled work-
ers among new generations joining the labour market is constant-
ly increasing as a result of the inversion of the population pyramid, 
these workers are not sufficient to replace those leaving the labour 
force (see Panel 2, where skill is approximated by educational at-
tainment level).
Finally, all the governments in the euro area have implemented 
new economic policy measures or have strengthened existing 
ones with a two-fold objective. On one hand, this was to stimulate 
employment demand, either through specific employment policies 
(short-time work programmes, cuts in social security contribu-
tions) or through fiscal stimulus programmes (reduction of direct 
taxes, creation of public-sector employment, aid for specific sec-
tors, such as the automobile sector). On the other, it was to miti-
gate the adverse effects of unemployment (training programmes, 
the strengthening of job seeking agencies, the increase in unem-
ployment assistance benefit). However, the economic situation 
and structural framework of each country prompted certain gov-
ernments to use certain measures more intensively. For instance, 
countries like Germany, Belgium and Italy have strengthened their 
short-time work programmes, which was reflected in the contrac-
tion in the number of hours worked per employee – by up to 4% in 
Germany and 2% in Italy and Belgium. In countries with more spe-
cific shocks, government efforts were focused on supplementing 
the income of the unemployed, updating their training and foster-
ing new activities.
Ultimately, the varied response, in terms of employment, of the 
various euro area countries to the recent contraction in activity has 
underlined the importance of an institutionally flexible labour mar-
ket within a monetary union. Moving towards wage bargaining 
models which permit flexible adjustments to changes in the eco-
nomic situation of firms; hiring models which encourage the in-
vestment in human capital; and education systems which enhance 
future workers’ adaptability and mobility have become a key ele-
ment, not only for cushioning the negative effects of a recession 
but also for boosting the recovery of activity. Accordingly, those 
countries which weathered the recession best in terms of employ-
ment (Germany, Belgium and France) are those which began to 
record the first signs of job creation in 2010 (see Panel 3).
BOX 4.1DETERMINANTS OF THE ASYMMETRICAL BEHAVIOUR OF EMPLOYMENT IN THE EURO AREA
1  See OECD Employment Outlook 2010.
2  In the Boletín Económico December 2010 the contraction of housing 
investment is estimated to account for 60% of the jobs destroyed during 
the crisis in Spain, if the spill-over effects on other sectors of the econo-
my are considered.
3  See Chapter 3 of IMF World Economic Outlook April 2010 and the ECB 
Final Report of the Wage Dynamics Network (December 2009).
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BOX 4.1DETERMINANTS OF THE ASYMMETRICAL BEHAVIOUR OF EMPLOYMENT IN THE EURO AREA (cont’d)
Rate of change in employment (%) (d)
Crisis 2008 Q3 - 2010 Q1 Crisis 1992 Q1 - 1993 Q2 Crisis 2008 Q1 - 2009 Q2
Ireland -10.3 0.5 1.0
Spain -8.1 1.8 1.7
Finland -3.2 2.8 0.3
Portugal -3.1 0.8 0.6
Euro area -2.4 1.0 0.3
Netherlands -2.0 1.1 0.1
Italy -2.0 1.0 0.2
Greece (a) -1.8 n.a. 0.2
France -1.4 0.5 0.1
Austria (a) -1.0 n.a. 0.3
Belgium -0.5 0.5 -0.1
Germany -0.1 1.0 0.0
RATE OF CHANGE AND ELASTICITY OF EMPLOYMENT
Elasticity of employment to GDP (b)
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a The data for Austria and Greece are from Eurostat and are only available to 2009 Q4.
b 3GDBNMSQ@BSHNM@QXRS@FDR@QDCDjMDC@RSGDODQHNCADSVDDMSGDK@RSPT@QSDQNEONRHSHUDPT@QSDQNMPT@QSDQFQNVSGNE@BSHUHSXHMSGDDTQN@QD@@R@VGNKD@MCSGD
 last Puarter of Puarter-on-Puarter decline.
c  Q@SHNU@KTDNEKDRRSG@MLD@MRSG@SSGDK@ANTQENQBDVHSGTMHUDQRHSXRSTCHDR@FDCADSVDDM@MCHRLNQDMTLDQNTRSG@MSGDBNQQDRONMCHMFFQNTO@FDC 
ADSVDDM@MC3GHRHRSGDB@RDNE&DQL@MX@MC%HMK@MC SSGDNSGDQDWSQDLDVNTKCAD/NQSTF@KVGDQDSGDK@ANTQENQBDVHSGTMHUDQRHSXRSTCHDR@FDCADSVDDM
25 and 34 is three times higher than the corresponding group aged betVeen 50 and 59. 
d 3GDBG@MFDHMDLOKNXLDMSV@RB@KBTK@SDCEQNLSGDK@RSPT@QSDQNEONRHSHUDPT@QSDQNMPT@QSDQFQNVSGHMDLOKNXLDMSHMSGDDTQN@QD@@R@VGNKD@MCSGDK@RS
Puarter of Puarter-on-Puarter decline. 
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goods) held at low levels, owing to the persistence of a high degree of economic slack in 
the area and wage moderation, which have offset the increases in indirect taxes and the 
recovery in profit margins that followed their sharp fall during the recession.
Against this background, and with some differences across countries, loans to households 
and non-financial corporations displayed a mild tendency to recover, which has continued 
in 2011, while the credit standards for the approval of loans maintained the restrictiveness 
built up in the past (see Chart 4.5). This increase in financing, along with the weakness of 
income in these sectors, caused the household debt ratio to rise slightly, while that of firms 
was corrected downward somewhat (see Table 4.1).
During 2010, it became clear that the policies to expand demand deployed with full force 
to combat the financial crisis in the previous period had reached their limits. Monetary 
policy remained expansionary, against a background of an absence of medium-term infla-
tionary pressures and slow growth. The ECB’s Governing Council kept its key policy rate 
at 1% until its meeting of 7 April, when it decided to raise it by 25 bp (see Chart 4.6). At the 
same time, the situation in the markets led the Eurosystem to extend the duration of its full 
allotment liquidity tenders. The extraordinary six and twelve-month loans that were intro-
duced when tensions on the financial markets were at their highest matured, without the 
generation of frictions, reducing gross liquidity. Also, the covered bond purchase programme 
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came to an end in June following the staggered purchase of €60 billion. This measure had 
been established in 2009 to mitigate the distortions generated by the crisis in this market 
segment and so avoid repercussions for the flow of bank credit and the interest rates 
charged for such credit. Similarly, the heightened tensions in certain public debt markets 
and their negative impact on the transmission mechanism led to the establishment of the 
Securities Markets Programme in May 2010, which concentrated on the sterilised pur-
chase of government bonds in the secondary markets of the countries most affected. 
During the first few months of this programme the purchases amounted to €60 billion. 
Subsequently, more purchases were made for smaller amounts, and the total portfolio 
acquired had risen to somewhat more than €76 billion by the end of April. 
In 2010 in the euro area as a whole, fiscal policy continued to make a decisive contribution 
to the recovery in economic activity, through the operation of automatic stabilisers and 
support to the banking system. However, after the first few months of the year the discre-
tionary measures to stimulate demand and support the labour market that had been de-
ployed during 2009 were progressively phased out and the excessive deficit situation in 
most of the euro area countries forced them to draw up medium-term fiscal consolidation 
plans, against a background in which the economic recovery began to firm. This change 
of direction in fiscal policy meant that the euro area deficit remained practically unchanged 
from the previous year, at 6% of GDP, although this represents a deterioration of almost 
6 percentage points (pp) from 2007. The cyclically adjusted deficit barely rose, as compared 
with an increase of 1.8 pp in 2009 (see Chart 4.7). The debt ratio for the euro area as a 
whole reached 85.4% of GDP, historically a very high level.
The tensions in the sovereign debt markets in April and May focused attention on the risks 
inherent in a situation of widespread excessive deficits and forced decisive and relatively 
rapid corrective measures to be taken to allay investors’ doubts regarding the sustainabil-
ity of public finances. The sovereign debt crisis thus led not only to the need to abandon 
the expansionary stance with which fiscal policy had responded in Europe to the first ef-
fects of the international financial crisis, but also to some urgency to turn it around so as 
to reduce long-term interest rates (by reducing the risk premium), giving space to private 
spending to recover momentum and contribute to a revival in activity. The first economy to 
step up its efforts was Greece, in return for the concession of financial assistance. Follow-
ing the extraordinary meeting of the Ecofin Council at the beginning of May, Spain introduced 
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consolidation measures to supplement those envisaged in its stability programmes and 
brought forward some of those planned for 2011. In the final quarter of the year it was 
Ireland that, after recognising a deficit of close to 30% of GDP in 2010, largely linked to the 
cost of the bank rescue operations, had to draw up a fiscal consolidation plan. Portugal 
also adopted packages of additional measures on various occasions. The other econo-
mies designed austerity programs which have generally begun to be applied this year. 
Under the consolidation plans established, the euro area general government deficit is 
expected to decline to almost 4% of GDP in 2011, and to below 3% in 2030.
The turmoil in the sovereign debt market has highlighted structural weaknesses in the in-
stitutional architecture of the monetary union, which were not given sufficient attention 
during the years of expansion but which now pose an unprecedented challenge to the 
area’s stability. Since the start of Stage Three of EMU, the agreed arrangements for eco-
nomic governance have been based on the principle of subsidiarity, whereby each state 
has maintained sovereignty over all economic policy decisions other than those of mone-
tary policy, although they have been subject to coordination mechanisms of varying de-
grees of strictness, designed to reduce the negative externalities that measures intro-
duced in one economy may have on the other countries in the area. In the case of fiscal 
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policy, the Stability and Growth Pact was established to maintain budget discipline, while 
macroeconomic and structural policies were subject to laxer peer review-based coordi-
nation mechanisms. This framework has proved insufficient to achieve the degree of eco-
nomic policy consistency necessary in a monetary union. On one hand, the SGP was not 
capable of promoting sustained fiscal consolidation during the expansionary phase, to 
give countries sufficient leeway to confront the downturn. The degree of discretion exist-
ing in the application of this procedure allowed many EU countries to fail to comply with 
the established deficit and debt thresholds repeatedly, without any effective mechanism 
being put in place to resolve the situation (sanctions or some other type of incentive). In 
many economies high levels of private indebtedness, substantial competitiveness losses 
and weaknesses in banking systems built up, which were not given due attention. Nor 
were there instruments available to channel financial support rapidly and transparently to 
those countries that might need it as part of an orderly crisis management process. As a 
backdrop to all this, an unprecedented degree of trade and financial integration signifi-
cantly increased the speed and force with which difficulties are transmitted from one 
economy to another.
The European institutions and governments decided to undertake a far-reaching review of 
this governance regime to correct the problems detected and to avoid similar situations 
occurring in future. The “Special Van Rompuy Group” was set up for this purpose in spring 
2010, with the mandate of studying how to make the architecture of the euro area more 
solid. The EU, ECB and all the EU Member States participated in this working group. The 
review of the institutional framework undertaken as a result of the group’s conclusions 
focuses on three fundamental areas: strengthening the SGP to increase fiscal discipline, 
improved supervision of macroeconomic imbalances and the creation of a permanent 
crisis-management mechanism. Although there are still aspects that may be changed dur-
ing the process of approval by the European Parliament, which should be concluded in 
June 2011, the fundamental elements are already well defined.
In the fiscal sphere, the reform assigns greater importance to the public debt criterion, as 
originally envisaged by the SGP. First, a more rapid adjustment path towards medium-term 
objectives is proposed for countries with a level of debt of over 60% of GDP and, second, 
when this threshold is exceeded an excessive deficit procedure (EDP) will be opened or, if 
one has already been opened, will not be closed, even if the deficit is below 3% of GDP, 
as long as the debt-to-GDP ratio is not being reduced satisfactorily. Moreover, the incen-
tives for governments to achieve a greater degree of compliance are strengthened, with 
the introduction of a broader, more transparent system of sanctions, to be activated at an 
earlier stage. It is also intended to make the application of these sanctions more auto-
matic through the reverse voting procedure, which involves automatic approval of the 
Commission’s proposals, unless they are rejected in time by a qualified majority of the 
governments. In addition, reform of the national fiscal frameworks is proposed, including 
the need for the accounts, statistics and forecasting practices to be adapted to EU rules, 
the adoption of multi-year fiscal planning to guarantee the medium-term objectives agreed, 
the establishment of rules limiting the expansion of public spending and indebtedness, 
and the creation of independent fiscal councils to supervise the design and execution of 
budgetary policy.
The reform introduces a new framework for the prevention and correction of excessive 
macroeconomic imbalances, including an early warning mechanism to prevent such im-
balances from jeopardising financial stability in the euro area. On its preventive side, this 
new mechanism will seek to identify the countries with a potential risk of “excessive imbal-
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ance”, using a set of economic indicators complemented by expert analysis. The exces-
sive imbalance procedure will be initiated once it is considered that said imbalance reach-
es an excessive scale. It will recommend the adoption of a series of corrective measures 
over a specific period for the country in question, and it might conclude with sanctions if 
the recommendations are repeatedly not fulfilled.
The strengthening of the fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance instruments will mini-
mise the possibility of vulnerabilities arising in the future that may jeopardise euro area 
stability. However, it is not reasonable to believe that this or any other framework might 
be capable of obviating that probability. The third pillar of the reform, therefore, resides on 
the setting up of a permanent crisis-management mechanism, the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), which will come into force in mid-2013, replacing the EFSF. To do this, 
article 136 of the EU Treaty has had to be amended, leaving the no bail-out clause in ar-
ticle 125 intact. This mechanism has an effective lending capacity of €500 billion, and it 
is intended to provide funds to solvent economies facing liquidity problems, under strict 
conditionality and at non-concessional interest rates. The financial assistance will nor-
mally take the form of loans and, in exceptional cases, of debt purchases on the primary 
market, without therefore attaining the operational flexibility that the Eurosystem had pro-
posed. In exceptional cases of insolvency, the mechanism will provide for an orderly re-
structuring of debt, which will be tackled on a case-by-case basis through negotiation 
with private creditors.
To provide for better coordination of the various economic policy decisions under this new 
framework, it was agreed to set up the European Semester. This will take place during the 
first six months of each year and will conclude with the formulation of specific fiscal, mac-
roeconomic and structural recommendations for each country. In January this year, the EC 
presented its Annual Report on Growth, which contains a roadmap for the euro area-wide 
economic policy that the different governments should take into consideration when set-
ting out their respective Stability Programmes and their National Reform Plans. Also inte-
grated into this new instrument is the revision of the preliminary structural reforms under 
the Europe 2020 strategy, approved in spring 2010 and whose main objectives are the 
increase in employment rates and social cohesion, the promotion of innovation (where 
hardly any improvements have been observed since the Lisbon strategy was set in place), 
the use of renewable energies and energy efficiency, the reduction in the early school leav-
ers rate and an increase in the proportion of the population completing higher studies. The 
aim is to re-launch growth-boosting policies that lessen the impact the crisis may have 
exerted on potential GDP and that prevent the re-emergence of imbalances.
Significant among the recommendations in the aforementioned report is, in the fiscal area, 
the advisability of pursuing the ongoing reform of pensions systems which many euro area 
economies have tackled in recent years, adapting benefits to the changes in life expec-
tancy and in the population pyramid, while encouraging people to work to a later age. 
Emphasis is also placed on the need for national fiscal frameworks and institutions to in-
clude rules restricting public spending and debt levels, in line with SGP commitments.
For progress in correcting macroeconomic imbalances, the economies that have built up 
losses on competitiveness should revise their collective bargaining arrangements so as to 
attain greater consistency between wage increases and changes in productivity. The 
countries with persistent current-account surpluses should analyse the causes that check 
the buoyancy of their demand. It is also considered important to boost the potential of the 
single market by means of the full transposition of the Services Directive in all the Member 
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States, the liberalisation of professional services and the development of instruments to 
attract private capital to finance growth, such as private equity funds. And, finally, it is 
recommended that social security contributions be reduced, setting this off by bolstering 
other taxes, that employment contracts be made more flexible and that disincentives to a 
second member of a family unit joining the labour market, which are present in some in-
come tax systems, be eliminated.
While all the foregoing measures involve a substantial improvement to the European gov-
ernance framework, the final results will obviously continue to depend largely on govern-
ments’ readiness to meet the commitments undertaken. To reinforce this commitment, the 
euro area heads of state and government signed the Euro Plus Pact in March 2011 with 
the aim of fostering competitiveness and employment, contributing to the sustainability of 
public finances and reinforcing financial stability. The priorities and measures considered 
in the Pact largely coincide with those in the EC’s Annual Growth Report under the afore-
mentioned procedures and instruments for the oversight of compliance therewith. But the 
Pact raises governments’ commitment to the maximum political level.
Finally, in the financial field, the crisis has also highlighted the shortcomings of a regula-
tory framework based exclusively on the prudential supervision of individual institu-
tions, one that is insufficient to appreciate in full the complex interrelatedness of finan-
cial assets and intermediaries that ultimately give rise to systemic risks. These 
considerations have led to the definition of a new, specific economic policy area, name-
ly macroprudential policy. This area has an eminently pre-emptive gearing and has the 
dual aim of making the financial system as a whole more resilient to shocks and mini-
mising the impact on the real economy in instances of crisis. The pursuit of macropru-
dential policy is being addressed through numerous national and international initia-
tives. In the European Union, this task has been assumed by the European Systemic 
Risk Board (ESRB), which has been fully operational since January 2011. This body is 
part of the European Financial Supervision System, which incorporates three new Euro-
pean supervisory authorities entrusted with microprudential duties. The ESRB, in which 
the ECB and the ESCB central banks participate, will oversee the European financial 
system as a whole. It will be tasked with identifying systemic vulnerabilities and with 
issuing non-binding warnings and recommendations, so that corrective measures may 
be adopted.
The projections available generally suggest that the pick-up in activity will continue to firm 
this year and next, albeit at a slower pace and in an environment still shrouded in uncer-
tainty, which poses highly complex risks on both the domestic and European fronts.
In the domestic policy sphere, several economies have to readjust spending in a way that 
will enable their public and private debt levels to become more sustainable. And, at the 
same time, they must restore lost competitiveness through productivity gains and wage 
containment. Strict compliance with fiscal consolidation commitments, which is a pre-
requisite for the area as a whole, poses a challenge which is all the greater the lesser the 
growth prospects for each country. In this connection, it is also essential to see through 
far-reaching structural reforms which, in addition to bringing adjustments about, increase 
growth potential, prevent the crisis from exerting a durable impact on labour markets and 
enhance the capacity to export to markets where the competitive pressures from the 
emerging economies are increasingly more demanding.
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In recent months euro area inflation has risen notably due largely to 
dearer commodity prices in international markets and to the increase 
in certain indirect taxes as a result of fiscal consolidation efforts. In 
particular, according to an accounting breakdown of the year-on-year 
growth of the HICP, it is estimated that the direct impact of these com-
ponents’ behaviour would explain around 60% of the increase in the 
inflation rate between February 2010 and February 2011 (see Panel 1). 
On the basis of historical evidence, these factors could generate indi-
rectly upward pressures on prices. For instance, certain estimates in-
dicate that a permanent increase of 10% in oil prices would represent, 
after three years, an average increase in the euro area HICP of 0.5 pp. 
0.1 pp would be due to price rises in goods which use any of the 
dearer inputs and another 0.1 pp would be as a result of the second-
round effects arising when the revision of inflation expectations 
prompts agents to demand increases in wages and margins.1 How-
ever, according to economic theory, inflation depends positively on 
future inflation expectations but also negatively on the level of eco-
nomic slack and, consequently, these indirect effects could have a 
more limited impact in a situation such as the present one.
The most recent empirical studies which approximate the level of 
slack using the output gap or the distance between recorded and po-
tential growth have shown that, in practice, it is difficult to find a stable 
relationship between these three variables. This can be attributed ba-
sically to three factors. Firstly, potential growth is measured with a high 
level of imprecision. Accordingly, Panel 2 shows that, at a time of great 
uncertainty such as at present, the discrepancies between interna-
tional organisations’ forecasts about the level of economic slack in the 
euro area for the period 2010-2012 may be high. In any event, all the 
estimates agree that the level of euro area activity is clearly below its 
potential and will remain so for the next two years. This is confirmed 
by the behaviour of the indicator of production capacity utilisation and 
of several measures of slack in the labour market.
Secondly, it is difficult to estimate which part of the temporary 
price variations ultimately feed through to households’ and firms’ 
inflation expectations. Accordingly, Panel 3 shows that, although 
BOX 4.2THE IMPACT ON INFLATION OF TEMPORARY SHOCKS IN SITUATIONS OF ECONOMIC SLACK
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1  See Strauch et al. (2010), Energy Markets and the Euro Area Macroecon-
omy, Occasional Paper no. 113, European Central Bank.
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inflation forecasts for 2011 have been revised upwards due to the 
recent rises in oil prices, both the forecasts for 2012 and the long-
term inflation expectations remain stable at approximately 2%.
Finally, it should be noted that the degree of correlation between in-
flation and the output gap depends on the nature of the shocks af-
fecting the economy. In particular, shocks which raise production 
costs, as is the case of oil prices, tend to reduce current and poten-
tial output to a similar extent and, consequently, the increase in pric-
es is not accompanied by significant variations in the output gap.
In this connection, according to the Banco de España’s BEMOD 
model,2 which distinguishes between different types of shocks, 
the rise in oil prices explains a very significant part of the in-
crease in European inflation (approximated in this case by the 
private consumption deflator) during the second half of 2010 
(see Panel  4). Similarly, in the first three quarters of the year 
wages have grown slightly higher than would be suggested by 
their determinants, compared with the moderation seen in the 
first decade of this century. By contrast, the fiscal consolidation 
plans and timid recovery of private demand are helping to con-
tain price rises, which suggests that the output gap remains 
negative. Finally, accommodative monetary policy contributed 
to the recovery during 2010 and to containing deflationary pres-
sures. Thus, supply shocks seem to explain a relevant portion 
of the increase in inflation in a situation of relative production 
slack.
Consequently, the final effects on inflation of the current rise in 
prices, which is closely linked to the increase in oil prices, will de-
pend crucially on the capacity of economic policy to keep inflation 
expectations anchored.
BOX 4.2THE IMPACT ON INFLATION OF TEMPORARY SHOCKS IN SITUATIONS OF ECONOMIC SLACK (cont’d)
The possibilities of growth spreading throughout the euro area also depend on the ongoing 
European banking system restructuring, downsizing and recapitalisation processes being 
satisfactorily concluded. Preserving financial stability will help break the vicious circles in 
which risks to economic growth, fiscal imbalances and bank funding difficulties all com-
bine, impairing agents’ confidence and translating into unwished-for tightening of financ-
ing conditions.
In the European arena, monetary policy also faces a complex horizon in which it will have 
to progressively adapt its current accommodative stance to the present cyclical upturn in 
the area as a whole, ensuring inflation expectations are anchored so as to prevent the re-
cent tensions stemming from dearer commodities and food from causing second-round 
effects on wages (see Box 4.2). Further, the ongoing withdrawal of the unconventional 
measures that were introduced at the most critical junctures of the financial crisis must be 
finalised, as retaining them longer than necessary might impair their effectiveness and 
detract from the central bank’s credibility, give rise to distortions in relative asset prices 
and delay reforms in the banking sector. Such a task, however, will call for careful timing 
of decisions, so as to prevent tensions arising on markets where the situation is still one of 
relative fragility.
The level of financial integration and economic interdependence attained in the euro area 
means a high degree of ambition must be maintained in the process of revision of Euro-
pean governance. Along these lines, the Eurosystem has called for the inclusion of more 
demanding criteria for the correction of imbalances and - especially in the fiscal area – 
greater automaticity for supervision and sanctioning procedures so as to make them less 
vulnerable to the willingness of national governments to comply with the commitments 
they have undertaken. It is also essential that the various mechanisms established by euro 
area governments to preserve financial stability across the area should have sufficient re-
sources and the appropriate instruments to effectively perform their functions. Finally, it 
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2  See J. Andrés, P. Burriel and Á. Estrada (2006), Bemod: a DSGE model 
for the Spanish economy and the rest of the euro area, Working Paper 
no. 0631, Banco de España, and J. Andrés, S. Hurtado, E. Ortega and C. 
Thomas (2010), “Spain in the euro: a General Equilibrium Analysis”, 
SERIEs Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Vol. 1, pp. 1 and 2.
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would also be advisable to reflect on how to deploy the other instruments available to the 
EU (including the budget) to support the adjustment and reform processes in countries 
facing difficulties.
More immediately, Greece’s apparent difficulties in returning to the market in 2012, as ini-
tially envisaged in their financial support programme, have raised uncertainty among in-
vestors and given rise to untimely debates about how realistic traumatic scenarios of slip-
page in the degree of economic integration attained in Europe and, therefore, of 
backtracking in the common European project may be. So that the considerable efforts to 
shape a new and more effective governance framework may come to fruition, this chal-
lenge - perhaps the most difficult one faced by the euro area since its creation - must first 
be conclusively overcome.
